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BERNARD SCHWARTZ**
The law, says Cardozo, has its periods of ebb and flow.' In
administrative law, the flood tides have been upon us for most of the
century. There is every reason to believe that this situation will continue
in the foreseeable future.
Administrative law, of course, mirrors the society itself; its very
existence has been called forth by the societal changes that have occurred
during the past two centuries. Its history reflects the changed nature of
society and the altered role of government to deal with those changes.
The future of our administrative law during the next century depends
upon the future of the American society. Administrative law in a wholly
collectivistic system is necessarily a different thing from what it is in a
purely atomistic or market system, or in the present-day mixed society. 2 If
Orwell's 1984 is to set the pattern for the next century, our administrative
law will be entirely different, in institutions and precepts, from the present
system. The same would be true, although perhaps to a lesser extent, if the
society is to be cast in the mold of Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead.
It is difficult enough to try to play the prophet with regard to legal
trends without having to foresee what American society will be like in the
next century. The present article is based upon the prediction made by C.
P. Snow in 1970, carried forward into the next century:
The worry I have met . . . among Americans is a fear of revolution. This
is totally unrealistic. . . . The underlying structures-as the young call
them-of American society are immensely strong. By structures I mean the
institutions that the radicals get cross about. . . . I would be prepared to
make a bet, though I shan't be there to collect, that by the year 2000, the
essential framework of [the United States] . . . will be remarkably similar
to what it is today.3
In other words, this paper assumes that there will be no societal
upheaval in the United States during its third century. That may be a rash
assumption in an era in which the pace of change in human affairs has
taken a quantum leap forward.4 Still, it is the only workable assumption
*This article is based upon Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Century. 29 AD. L. REV. 291
(1977), which has been revised and expanded for this Symposium.
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2. Cf. Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, in AMERIC%, Law: Tile THIRD
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for a paper devoted to legal trends, even in an area so dependent upon the
nature of the society.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Administrative power is as old as the American government itself.
The very first session of the first Congress enacted three statutes con-
ferring important administrative powers: Well before the setting up
of the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC] in 1887 6 -the date usually
considered the beginning of our administrative law-agencies were
established which possessed the rule-making and/ or adjudicatory powers
that one usually considers to be characteristic of an administrative agency.
Modern administrative law, nevertheless, may be said to start with the
ICC, the archetype of the modern administrative agency. It has served as
the model for a whole host of federal and state agencies that were vested
with delegated powers patterned after those conferred upon the first
federal regulatory commission.
Conscious use of the law to regulate the society has required the
creation of an ever-growing administrative bureaucracy. The ICC has
spawned a progeny that has threatened to exhaust the alphabet in the use
of initials to characterize the new bodies. Nor has the expansion of
administrative power been limited to the ICC-type economic regulation.
A trend toward extension into areas of social welfare began with the
Social Security Act of 1935.7 Disability benefits, welfare, aid to
dependent children, health care, and a growing list of social services have
since come under the guardianship of the administrative process. The
increasing concern with environmental matters has also given rise to new
agencies with expanded powers. The traditional area of regulation is now
dwarfed by the growing fields of social welfare and environmental concern.
Will the trend toward proliferation of administrative agencies
continue, or even be intensified, during the coming century? The current
disillusionment with government in general and the administrative process
in particular may lead some to conclude that a negative answer is
appropriate-that the trend toward administrative power has already
passed its peak. The most suggestive movement in administrative law
today is one that aims to rationalize administrative power. Administra-
tive reform is high on the political agenda; the Carter Administration has
made administrative reform a major part of its domestic program.
5. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. v, I Stat. 29 (repealed 1790); Act of Sept. i, 1789, ch. xi. I Stat. 55
(repealed 1792); Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. xxiv, I Stat. 95 (expired).
6. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1970 &
Supp. V. 1975)).
7. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1970 & Supp. V. 1975)).
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A. Delegation of Powers
During the past half century a prime task of our developing
administrative law has been to legitimize the vast delegations of power that
have been made to administrative agencies, particularly at the time of the
New Deal. The 1935 Schechter and Panama cases8 struck down the most
important early New Deal measure on the ground that it contained
excessive delegations of power because the authority granted under it was
not restricted by a defined standard. Today the opinions in those cases
seem written from another world. The courts have all but abandoned the
view expressed in Schechter and Panama that laws delegating power must
be invalidated unless they contain limiting standards. Wholesale
delegations have become the rule in our administrative law. The
touchstone has become the "public interest" criterion. As Charles Reich
summarized it, "The basic theme [is] simple: economic power ... must
be subjected to the 'public interest' "9 as defined by the administrator.
The virtual demise of the requirement of meaningful standards to
restrict the authority delegated to an administrative body has serious
implications. The requirement serves the function of ensuring that
fundamental policy decisions will be made, not by irresponsible (in the
political sense) bureaucrats, but by the elected representatives of the
people. As Judge J. Skelly Wright put it, "At its core, the doctrine is
based on the notion that agency action must occur within the context of a
rule of law previously formulated by a legislative body."' ° It is thejob of
the legislature to make the difficult policy choices in a representative
system. When the legislature passes this job on to nonelected officials, it
contributes substantially to the dilution of democratic responsibility.
As recently as 1963, three dissenting Justices of the United States
Supreme Court would have used the doctrine against delegation without
defined standards to invalidate the power given to the Secretary of the
Interior to allocate water resources among competing states." In 1974,
the Court itself stated that "the requirements of Schechter" were still
hurdles for delegating statutes to overcome 2 and, in 1976, it repeated the
rule that a delegation of power must be accompanied by discernible
standards. 13  Some of our most distinguished judges, speaking off the
bench, have called for revival of meaningful limitations on delegation.'
4
Nevertheless, it is difficult to foresee a stemming of the flood of
8. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
9. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 45 (1970).
10. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L. J. 575, 583 (1972).
II. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 646 (1963) (Harlan, J., Douglas, J., and Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
12. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336. 342 (1974).
13. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 458, 559 (1976).
14. See W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 217 (1974); Wright, supra note 10, at 582-86.
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virtually uncontrolled delegations. The trend is all toward allowing the
legislature to delegate power as it chooses, with or without meaningful
standards. That trend seems likely to continue, particularly in an age of
endemic crises. Although some judges still talk the language of the
standards requirement, their words have an increasingly anachronistic
ring.
We can also project a continuing expansion of administrative power
into areas traditionally occupied by the courts. When the Federal Trade
Commission Act was before Congress, Senator Sutherland asserted that
the adjudicatory authority Congress proposed to vest in the FTC "is a
judicial power and belongs to the courts."' 5 Hence, he continued, the Act
contained an invalid delegation of judicial power to the proposed
commission. Twenty years later, however, as Mr. Justice Sutherland, he
had no difficulty upholding the independent status of the FTC, although he
recognized that it "was created by Congress as a means of carrying into
operation legislative and judicial powers."' 6
The evolution in Sutherland's thinking on delegation of judicial
power has paralleled that of his judicial confreres during the present
century. Workmen's compensation, at first resisted as contrary to basic
conceptions, was soon accepted by courts throughout the country and has
virtually replaced the industrial accident case, the typical tort action of a
century ago. Indeed, the future of much of tort law may lie in the exten-
sion of the principle of compensation to other areas, notably to the field
of automobile accidents. Puerto Rico has already established an
Automobile Accident Compensation Administration."' By the end of the
century we may expect similar agencies in the states, particularly as the
inadequacies of no-fault insurance become apparent We may also expect
that judicial jurisdiction will give way to administrative jurisdiction in
other fields in which the courts have not been able to adjudicate effectively,
including family law and probate law, and possibly business law. As the
Supreme Court has recently recognized, constitutional guarantees
applicable in the courts, such as the right to jury trial in civil cases, do not
stand in the way of delegations of adjudicatory authority to administrative
agencies. 8
Yet there is a paradox in this accelerating trend toward administrative
justice. As expressions of disillusionment have increasingly been heard
about the agencies in operation, the law is finding new worlds for the
administrative process to conquer. To speak of public institutions as
endowed with life is more than metaphor. The governmental body, like
15. 3 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 1778 (1973).
16. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935).
17. P. R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 2060 (Supp. 1976).
18. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety& Health Review Comm'n,430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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the animal, has periods of vigor and decline. The vital spark has gone out
of the administrative agency. Even undue influence and corruption-
cancers of the governmental organ-have appeared. Yet despite all the
concern and seeming activity in Washington and elsewhere, there is no
effective movement to reduce administrative power. If anything, the
opposite trend seems likely to continue.
B. Administrative Criminal Law
Norval Morris has called for an administrative law of crimes as an
important need of criminal law during the next century.' 9 Not too long
ago such a call would have been inconsistent with basic administrative law
principles, since there appeared to be a strict line between civil and criminal
cases in the delegation of adjudicatory authority to agencies. That linehas
now become a penumbra. There exists a borderland where at least some
criminal jurisdiction may be transferred from courts to agencies in a
manner that is consistent with administrative and constitutional law
principles.
The development of administrative criminal law is underscored by
Rosenthal v. Hartnett20 which upheld New York's legislative scheme to
remove most traffic offenses from the courts to administrative agencies.
Petitioner in Rosenthal had been found guilty of speeding and fined
fifteen dollars by a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer. This
determination was affirmed by the Appeals Board of the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the City of New York. Petitioner challenged the
determination as unconstitutional, focusing his claim narrowly on the
quantum-of-proof issue. But the court framed the issue more broadly in
terms of the "constitutionality of the substitution in the adjudication of
traffic infractions of an administrative agency and administrative
procedures for courts of criminal jurisdiction and judicial procedures."2'
On these terms, the court agreed that the legislature might transfer
cognizance of traffic infractions to the jurisdiction of an administrative
agency. The reason given was the intensely practical one of necessity: the
volume of traffic offenses and the congestion in the criminal courtsjustified
the legislature in seeking an administrative solution.
Practical necessity compels the affirmative answer to the question of
the validity of such a delegation of criminaljurisdiction to an agency. The
operation of most traffic courts serves only to bring both the courts and the
law into disrepute. Theoretical objections to the delegation of even minor
criminal jurisdiction to an agency have had to yield to the growing
inadequacies of traffic courts, particularly in large metropolitan areas.
19. Morris, Criminal Law-Some Second Century Problems and Third Century Sohtions, in
•AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY 97 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
20. 36 N.Y.2d 269, 326 N.E.2d 811, 367 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1975).
21. Id. at 272, 326 N.E.2d at 813, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
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The "administrative traffic court" may prove but the first step in
agency intrusion into the criminal law. We may expect increasing ef-
forts to transfer other lesser offenses, notably those involving violations
of sumptuary laws, from courts to agencies. Thus, the Governor of New
York in 1971 called for the transfer ofjurisdiction from the courts of "those
offenses and other matters that can be effectively handled outside the court
system., 22  Administrative "regulation must replace our present futile
reliance upon the criminal justice system in such areas. 23  If these
recommendations are followed, the administrative agency may soon
spawn progeny that will dwarf the present criminal justice system.
This prediction must, however, be qualified by constitutional
considerations. In the criminal field, the Bill of Rights places upon the
delegation of adjudicatory powers to agencies limits that do not exist with
regard to civil cases. The guarantee of trial by jury would alone bar the
trial of felony cases by tribunals other than courts. In addition,
administrative agencies may not be vested constitutionally with the power
to impose imprisonment as a penalty.24 If criminal jurisdiction is
delegated to agencies, punishment must be limited to monetary penalties.
Transfer of criminal jurisdiction from courts to agencies means that im-
prisonment must be eliminated as punishment for the offenses con-
cerned, and the offenses should be reclassified as noncriminal.
In addition, a caveat should be imposed on the current willingness to
abandon the traditional reluctance to confer criminal jurisdiction upon
agencies. Considerations of practical efficiency in areas such as traffic
violations scarcely justify stripping the courts of a major part of their
criminal competence. Perhaps conduct such as gambling and prostitution
should no longer be considered sufficiently harmful to society to justify
rigid prohibition. Nevertheless, while such acts remain offenses, we
should hesitate to remove the safeguards of the criminal law from those
charged with their commission. What is to be feared is that the present
crisis in the criminal courts will exert a kind of pressure which will make
what was previously clear seem doubtful, and which could bend even
seemingly settled administrative law principles too far.
C. Legislative Control
President Carter has asserted the unconstitutionality of the so-called
legislative veto25-that is, statutory provisions empowering one or both
Houses of Congress to disapprove executive and administrative action by
22. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1971, at 26, col. 5.
23. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1970, at 80, col. 5 (quoting Mayor Lindsay of New York City urging
that housing offenses, gambling, and prostitution be removed from the criminal courts and transferred
to administrative agencies).
24. Wong Wing v. United States. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
25. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1978, at 1, col. i.
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resolution not subject to the President's veto power.26 The President's
objection appears unlikely to stem increasing efforts, in which the
legislative veto technique plays a prominent part, to secure effective
legislative control over administrative action.
The increasing use of the legislative veto is a direct reflection of the
growing malaise over uncontrolled administration. In the words of a
recent Neu, York Times editorial, "Imperial Presidencies and imperious
agencies have made the 'legislative veto' increasingly attractive to
Congress. . . . It has been only natural for Congress to seek a redress in
the balance.",27 The great need in an era of ever-expanding administrative
authority, accompanied as it is by an almost reciprocal disillusionment
with governmental agencies, is to establish effective safeguards. One
response to that need has been the growing interest in more adequate
legislative oversight. Apart from such indirect legislative pressures as
control over appropriations, power over appointments, and exercise of
investigative authority, legislative control over the executive has generally
been absent from American administrative law. This lack of effective
direct legislative supervision constitutes an important lacuna in the system.
Legislative review of administrative action, through techniques such
as the legislative veto, represents a worthwhile attempt to fill this void.
The movement to provide for legislative review has been spreading in
recent years. According to a 1976 House report, at least 183 legislative
veto provisions have been included in federal statutes since 1933;28 by a
more recent estimate, Congress has resorted to the device in 48 measures
over the past four years. 29  Use of the legislative veto technique by state
legislatures has also grown substantially. In 1955, six states had specific
provisions for legislative review of agency rules and regulations.3"
Currently, provisions for some form of legislative review are part of the
statute book in at least twenty-eight states.3' In most of these, review is by
26. See generally Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
27. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at 18, cols. 1-2.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. See Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: L The
American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1038 (1955).
31. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 362-63. See ALASKA STAT. § 24.20A00-A60 (1976): COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-4-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4-170 (West Supp. 1978); FL. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.60.
120.545 (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104 (Supp. 1977); IDA1O CODE §§ 67-5217 to 5218
(West Supp. 1977); Pub. Act. No. 80-1035, § 7.06,1977 I11. Laws 1571 (to be codified at ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 127, § 1007.06); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.8 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 77-426 (Supp. 1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.087 (Baldwin Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:968 (West Supp. 1977);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 2504 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40 (Supp. 1977); MIC11. STAT.
ANN. § 3.560(145) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.965 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.037 (Vernon
1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-4203.1 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908 (1976): NEV. REv.
STAT. §§ 223B.067, .068 (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§
171.705-713 (1975); Act No. 176, art. I, § 6, 1977 S.C. Acts 392; S.D. COMPILED LA vs AN-. § 1-26-1.2
(1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-535 (Supp. 1977); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 5(g)
(Vernon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 817 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE§§ 29A-3-11 to 12(1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.56 (West Supp. 1978). See also ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.511.05(8) (West
Supp. 1978) (legislative review of State Park Board regulations).
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legislative committees. In ten states, the legislature itself may exercise the
legislative veto.32 In nine of these states, the annulment may be
accomplished by joint or concurrent resolution of both Houses; in
Oklahoma, a resolution passed by either House suffices. 33
At its 1977 annual meeting the National Conference of State
Legislatures recommended that its members adopt procedures for
reviewing administrative rules and regulations.34 This recommendation
should stimulate the spread of legislative review techniques throughout the
country. There is strong sentiment in Congress for setting up an
analogous federal system of general review of agency rules. A bill
providing for such a system narrowly failed to receive a required two-
thirds majority in the Ninety-fourth Congress. 3
Despite the Carter strictures, the few cases in point uphold the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.36 It would be most unfortunate if
specious construction of a constitutional doctrine should bar the use of one
of the most promising methods of control of executive and administrative
action. Congress is in a unique position to supervise administrative
authority,37 and the legislative veto is a valuable tool in this task. The
great need in an era of expanding administrative authority is to establish
effective safeguards outside the executive branch. Independent control
can, in practice, be exercised only by the legislative and judicial branches.
In this country, we have adequately developed control by the courts.
Techniques for direct legislative supervision, however, have been ne-
glected. The legislative veto enables American legislatures to assume
their rightful place as effective supervisors of delegated powers. This
writer predicts that the legislative veto and other legislative review
techniques will play an increasingly important part in the administrative
law of the next century.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
American administrative law has been based upon Justice Frank-
furter's oft-quoted assertion that "the history of liberty has largely been
the history of the observance of procedural safeguards." 38 Our system,
32. Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina. Tennessee,
Texas. See statutes cited at note 31 supra.
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308(d) (West 1976);see other statutes cited at note 31 supra, See
also GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104(f (Supp. 1977) (annulling resolution mu.t be passed by two-thirds vote
or be submitted to Governor for signature or veto).
34. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 361.
35. Id. at 352, 360-61.
36. McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1011 (1978);
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). See generally
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 369-73; Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1977,30 AD, L. RLV.
167, 169-71 (1978).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
38. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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more than any other, has emphasized administrative procedure (the
procedural requirements imposed upon what Continental jurists term the
active administration). The starting point in such emphasis has, of course,
been the constitutional demand of due process. "When we speak of audi
alteram partem-hear the other side-we tap fundamental precepts that
are deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history, 39 precepts that are
now a command, spoken with the voice of due process.40 But our law has
gone far beyond the constitutional minimum. Building upon the due
process foundation, the law has constructed an imposing edifice of formal
procedure. The consequence has been a virtual judicialization of the
agencies; from the establishment of the ICC to the present, the
administrative process has been set in the courtroom mold.
Complaints of unduejudicialization of administrative procedure have
long been heard. As Judge Friendly has noted, "[C]ases before the old-
line regulatory agencies have been characterized by enormous records
(read by no one), great expense, and giant delays." 4' Perhaps the problem
was not as pressing as long as it was confined to the regulatory agencies.
"Burdensome though it is, the cost of [formal] procedure is often but a
small part of the amount involved in any regulatory case of consequence
and can be borne without difficulty by a multi-million dollar corporation
of the kind commonly regulated by the big federal agencies. That class of
administr& can be left to take care of itself.4 2
But formal procedural requirements are no longer limited to cases
involving "that class of administrts." In a 1975 article Judge Friendly
declared that "we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due
process in the last five years than in the entire period since ratification of
the Constitution. 4 a What this writer has called the "Goldberg v. Kelly
revolution'"44 has extended due process requirements from the traditional
field of regulatory administration to the burgeoning benefactory role of the
welfare state. The law has pressed the newer areas of social welfare into
the judicialized mold of the regulatory process.
How far will the trend toward judicialization go? Will procedures
that have become a travesty in the courtroom and have been proving ever
less effective in the regulatory area continue to be imposed on the
expanding administrative apparatus?
A. Right to be Heard
It is easier to answer these questions today than five years ago, when
39. In re Andrea B., 405 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (Fam. Ct. 1978).
40. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41. Friendly, Foreword to B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENTr'
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES xvi-xvii (1972).
42. Id. at 113. Judge Friendly, however, disputes this statement. Id. at xvii.
43. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1975).
44. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS: A CASEBOOK 369 (1977).
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the Goldberg v. Kelly revolution was at its height. Goldberg" and its
progeny at first advanced the frontiers of due process so rapidly that it
seemed there might be no stopping place.46 Goldberg's holding that there
was a right to be heard prior to agency action was extended en masse to all
the newer areas of administrative power, including welfare,47 disability,
41
medicare,49 unemployment, 50 education, 51 and housing.52 Due process
was held to require a full adversary hearing, governed by the adjudicatory
requirements of the federal Administrative Proceduie Act. This led Judge
Friendly to assert that
over-judicialization in the regulatory agencies in the United States is as
nothing compared to what would result if all the safeguards of the
Administrative Procedure Act were to be applied to the denial, withdrawal,
or curtailment of welfare, medical, and unemployment payments, and other
benefits. . . . The United States would be buried under an avalanche of
paper, like Professor Fulgence Tapir in Anatole France's Penjuin Island-if
indeed enough reporters to type the records could be found.:"
The Goldberg v. Kelly revolution may, however, have reached its
apogee, if not its Thermidor. More recent cases, particularly Mathews v.
Eldridge,54 which held that due process did not require an opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability
benefits, drastically limit the reach of the due process right.
Eldridge shows that the law may leave Goldberg v. Kelly to stand
virtually alone in vindicating the due process right to a pretermination
hearing, at least where monetary benefits are at stake. Goss v. Lopez, 5
holding that high school students were denied clue process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment when they were temporarily
suspended from their schools, without hearing either prior to suspension
45. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that a state that terminates public
assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording the opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due proces; in violation of the due proecs
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4, the Court
delineated the elements that must be included in a pretermination hearing under Goldberg as follows:
(I) "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination"; (2)
"an effective opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses
and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4)
an "impartial" decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and evidence
adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied on,
46. Cf. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1316 (asserting that Goss v. Lopez pulled the proctdural stops
in Goldberg, thereby advancing the frontiers of due process without giving any indication of a stopping
place).
47. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
48. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
49. Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973).
50. California Human Resources Dep't v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
51. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
52. Escalera v. Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Friendly, supra note 41, at xviii.
54. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
55. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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or within a reasonable time thereafter, shows that cases not concerning
money payments still stand on a different footing.5 6  There is a line
between the two types of cases in the relative ability to repair the effects of
an improper decision. One may question, however, whether the results in
Eldridge and Goss are consistent. The Eldridge opinion emphasizes that
"the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular
decision ' 5 7 is a key factor to be considered in determining whether there is
any due process right to a pretermination hearing. If that is the case, who
suffers the greater deprivation, the pupil subject to a short suspension or
the worker whose government disability payments are ended?
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the matter, Board of
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,58 further qualifies the
Goss decision. Goss had extended the right to be heard to school
discipline cases for which there had previously been thought to be a due
process floor. The dissenters in Goss protested that the majority ruling
brought within the due process guarantee a multitude of discretionary
decisions in the educational process, giving as illustrations "[tihe student
who is given a failing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a school reserved for
children of less than average ability, or who is placed in the 'vocational'
rather than the 'college preparatory' track."5 9 This would judicialize the
educational process to an extent that would make it unworkable.
Horowitz indicates that such extreme fears are unwarranted. In that
case, the medical school at a state university had dismissed respondent as a
student because of faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical performance.
The Court held that educational decisions which turn on academic (as
opposed to disciplinary) factors do not necessitate a due process hearing.
The decision to dismiss respondent, like the decision of a teacher on the
proper grade for a student,60 turns on expert evaluation of cumulative
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
adjudicatory decision-making. Goss v. Lopez is thus limited to
nonacademic disciplinary proceedings. As such, its hearing requirement
does not put most educational determinations (including those noted by
the Goss dissenters) into an overjudicialized straitjacket.
By way of summary, it may be said that although Goldberg v. Kelly
will probably continue to be followed, it will be confined to the welfare
56. In Goss v. Lopez, the Court, however, was careful to point out that the type of hearing it
required stopped short of a trial-type proceeding and would not include the opportunity to secure
counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, or to call witnesses. Rather, the Court required
effective notice and informal hearing to allow the student to give his version of the events and thus
protect against erroneous action. Id. at 583-84.
57. 424 U.S. at 341.
58. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
59. 419 U.S. at 598.
60. See Home v. Cox, 551 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1977).
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termination case. In cases involving other types of public largess,
Mathews v. Eldridge will set the procedural theme. This does not mean no
due process protection, but only that a pretermination hearing is not
necessary. The right to a post-termination hearing was reaffirmed in
Eldridge, in which the Court stressed the claimant's right to an evidentiary
hearing on administrative review of the decision terminating his disability
benefits.
B. Flexible Due Process
Goldberg v. Kelly has also been diluted in another important respect.
The Court there indicated that when due process required a hearing, a full
evidentiary hearing was demanded. The opinion of Justice Brennan
stated that a full judicial-type hearing was not necessary. This disclaimer
must not, however, be given too much weight. "After the usual litany that
the required hearing 'need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial,' Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to demand almost all the elements of
one."61 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court itself conceded that, in
Goldberg, "the Court held that a hearing closely approximating a judicial
trial is necessary.,
62
The Goldberg requirement of a judicial-type evidentiary hearing may
pose a serious dilemma for a system of administrative law that has
extended procedural requirements from the traditional regulatory field to
the expanding area of social welfare. However fair in theory, fully
judicialized procedure may frustrate effective administration in fields such
as welfare and social security. This is true not only because of the nature
of the cases involved, but also because of their number. When we move
from the ICC-type agencies to those administering welfare or social
security, we move into an area of mass administrative justice, in which
cases are measured not in the thousands but in the millions. "To impose in
each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
administrative facilities. . . . Moreover, further formalizing the
• . . process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not
only make it too costly . . . but also destroy its effectiveness."
63
In areas of mass administrative justice, such as welfare or social
security, formal adjudicatory procedure may have to give way when it can
serve only to frustrate effective administration. As the Supreme Court has
said about the social security system, "The system's administrative
structure and procedures, with essential determinations numbering into
the millions, are of a size and extent difficult to comprehend .... 'Such a
system must be fair-and it must work.' ,,64
61. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1299.
62. 424 U.S. at 333.
63. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 656, 583 (1975).
64. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
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If our administrative law system is to be workable as well as fair, it will
have to realize that due process is a flexible concept. The Procrustean
notion65 that when due process demands a hearing it must demand a full-
scale judicial-type trial in every case has already started to give way. The
Supreme Court itself has declared that "[t]he judicial model of an
evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decision-making in all circumstances. '66  The law must
recognize that due process need not necessarily mean traditional adversary
process. Administrative procedure must develop as a compromise
between what a British judge once called the methods of natural justice and
those of courts of justice.67
For this to be accomplished the law will have to move beyond the
Eldridge retreat from Goldberg v. Kelly, a retreat that permits agency
action without a pretermination hearing. It must also recognize that the
still-required post-termination hearing need not necessarily conform to all
the requirements of the traditional adjudicatory hearing in every case.
As Judge Friendly has urged, it is only "some kind of hearing"6 8 that is
required by due process. The type of hearing required may vary with the
seriousness of the particular case. Due process requirements should
depend upon incremental analysis-that is, gains versus losses for each
additional procedure required. Full judicialization may be demanded in
cases with the most serious consequences, such as welfare termination or
school expulsion. In other cases, due process may demand less. Since
there are alternatives less burdensome than fully judicialized hearings, the
law should choose the less burdensome alternatives when the incremental
gain in the more burdensome procedure would be outweighed by the
marginal costs, for example, in time and expense.
Ingraham v. Wright6 9 illustrates the trend toward the flexible due
process conception, which refuses to hold agencies to all the requirements
of a full "evidentiary hearing" in every case in which due process demands
an opportunity to be heard. Ingraham dealt with the question whether
imposition of disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools was
consonant with the requirements of due process. The Court found that
corporal punishment implicated a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. It did not, however, conclude that, as in Goss v. Lopez, 70 notice
and hearing were required by due process prior to imposition of the
disciplinary penalty. In this case, said the Court, traditional common-law
remedies were fully adequate to afford due process.
65. Cf. Friendly, supra note 41, at xviii-xix (finding "no support for the thought that the due
process clause guarantees opportunity for argument in every case.").
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
67. Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120, 138.
68. See generally Friendly, supra note 43.
69. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
70. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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Some might say that Ingraham v. Wright (which held that corporal
punishment might be imposed in schools without prior notice and hearing)
is inconsistent with Goss v. Lopez (which held that a school could not hand
down a ten-day suspension without giving the student notice and an
informal hearing). According to the Court, there is no such inconsistency.
In Goss, the school suspension interrupted the student's entitlement to
education; the corporal punishment at issue in Ingraham had no such
result. "Unlike Goss v. Lopez . . . , this case does not involve the state-
created property interest in public education. The purpose of corporal
punishment is to correct a child's behavior without interrupting his
education., 7
1
More important for our purposes is the fact that the Ingraham Court
went on to say that "even if the need for advance procedural safeguards
were clear, the question would remain whether the incremental benefit
could justify the cost. 72  Prior hearing as a universal constitutional
requirement in corporal punishment cases would unduly burden school
discipline. " 'At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the
individual affected . . . and to society in terms of increased assurance
that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.' . . . We think that
point has been reached in this case. 7 3
In Ingraham the burden that would have been imposed by requiring
administrative safeguards of notice and hearing was considered much
greater than any benefit to be derived from predisciplinary hearings:
"[T]he probable value, if any, of additional . . . procedural safeguards"
must be balanced against "the [state] interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
• . . procedural requirement would entail. 74  In short, the Court fol-
lowed the incremental approach previously urged."
C. Rule-Making Procedure
A word should also be said about procedure in rule-making. That
subject is almost entirely statutory. Rule-making is the administrative
equivalent of the legislative process of passing a statute.76 Hence, agencies
engaged in rule-making are, as a general proposition, no more subject to
constitutional procedural requirements than is the legislature engaged in
enacting a statute. Unless a statute requires otherwise, a rule will
normally not be held invalid because of agency failure to hold a hearing or
to follow any other procedures prior to promulgating the rule.
71. 430 U.S. at 674 n.43.
72. Id. at 680.
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id. at 675.
75. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
76. Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 909 (Alaska 1971).
(Vol. 39:805
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did, however,
impose procedural requirements on rule-making. Under the APA, two
types of rule-making, formal and informal, 77 are recognized. Formal rule-
making exists when rules must be preceded by a"trial-type" hearing. The
APA approach to formal rule-making is a hybrid one that imposes
adjudication requirements upon a rule-making proceeding.78
The Supreme Court has limited the scope of formal rule-making
under the APA. United States v. Florida East Coast Railvay Co.79 holds
that formal requirements must be followed only when the enabling statute
expressly requires the rules to be made "on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing.' '80 This virtually makes a talismanic test of the
language of section 554(c) of the APA.8' But the result is desirable. Trial-
type procedures with a requirement of basis on the record are out of place
in rule-making.8 2 It would be most unfortunate for formal rule-making to
be extended to cases not covered by the Florida East Coast decision.
Informal rule-making under the APA is usually called notice and
comment rule-making, since all that is required is notice of proposed rule-
making and an opportunity for interested persons to submit comments to
the agency concerned. Notice and comment rule-making has been
criticized as not providing enough procedural safeguards. Although some
courts tried to impose stricter procedures, the Supreme Court has recently
aborted this line of cases. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,3 the court of appeals had struck
down a rule dealing with the uranium fuel cycle in nuclear power reactors
because of inadequacies in the procedures employed in the rule-making
proceedings. The agency had complied with the APA notice and
comment requirements, but the appellate court held that more should be
required in order to facilitate full ventilation of the issues. The Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that section 553 of the APA lays down the
only procedural requirements for informal rule-making.?4 To require
77. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 475 F.2d 842,851 (10th Cir. 1973). ceti.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
78. Id.
79. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
80. Id. at 234.
81. Section 554(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides:
(c) The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for-
(1) The submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or
proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest
permit; and
(2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent,
hearing and decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title
5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1976).
82. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 60 (1976).
83. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
84. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides in pertinent part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
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more, said the Court, would "almost compel" the agency to conduct all
rule-making proceedings with the full panoply of procedural devices
normally associated only with adjudicatory hearings. 5
The Supreme Court decision in Vermont Yankee means that if
agencies are to be required to follow stricter procedures than those
imposed by the APA, such requirements will have to be imposed by
Congress, not the courts. It is, however, unlikely that the APA will be
amended to require more than notice and comment procedures in most
rule-making. We are living in a period which has seen a tremendous
expansion of rule-making power. Both Congress and the courts have
fostered the trend toward rule-making. But that does not mean that rule-
making should be moved in a judicialized direction. To do so would
defeat the principal advantages of the rule-making process.
D. Administrative Judiciary
The Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between American
law, in which one system of law courts applies both public and private law,
and the practice in a Continental country such as France, which
administers public law through a system of administrative courts separate
from those dealing with private law questions.8 6 The French administra-
tive courts are specialized tribunals that review the legality of administra-
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally seved or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include -
(]) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than
30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with
the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
85. 435 U.S. at 547.
86. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 495 (1953).
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tive acts. Although proposals have been made for establishment of
comparable administrative courts in our system,8 7 the French concept of
administrative reviewing courts has largely remained foreign to American
administrative lawyers.
Since enactment of the federal Administrative Procedure Act,
however, the American system has taken another path toward the
establishment of an administrative trial judiciary. TheAPA set up within
each agency a corps of independent hearing officers called hearing
examiners. These examiners, who were given hearing powers comparable
to those of trial judges as well as substantial decision-making powers, were
to preside over hearings governed by the APA. Under the APA,
examiners may be empowered to issue initial decisions, which become the
decisions of the agencies concerned unless those decisions are appealed.
In virtually all the important federal agencies the power to make such ini-
tial decisions was delegated to examiners by the relevant agency rules.
By the APA, "Congress intended to make hearing examiners 'a special
class of semi-independent . . . hearing officers.' "8 The congressional
intent was to vest agency hearing officers with the status of quasi-judges,
since their functions were comparable to those of trial judges. "On paper
at least," Senator McCarran, the Senate sponsor of the APA said, "they
are to be very nearly the equivalent of Judges, albeit operating within the
federal system of administrative justice." Senator McCarran tried to
complete the judicial analogy with a bill designed to have the President
appoint the examiners, who were to have tenure during good behavior.
This bill, however, never got out of committee. A similar fate met more
recent bills that would have enabled Congress to change the title of hearing
personnel from "examiner" to "administrative trial judge."
Then, in 1972, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a
regulation that made the change. Under the regulation the title of hearing
officers appointed under the APA was changed from "hearing examiners"
to "administrative law judges."90 By a simple administrative stroke of the
pen the federal agencies were endowed with a full-grown administrative
judiciary that was vested with the power to make initial decisions in most
adjudicatory proceedings. Now the change has been given statutory
imprimatur with a 1978 law confirming the new title.91
The evolution of federal hearing officers-from pre-APA agency
subordinates to APA hearing examiners and now to judicial status as
administrative law judges-will set the pattern for the developing system
87. We have had some limited experience with specialized review tribunals. See B. SCHWARTZ,
FRENCH ADMINisTRATIvE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAw WORLD 322 (1954).
88. Ramspeck v. Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953).
89. McCarran, Three Years of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act-A Study in
Legislation, 38 GEo. L.J. 574, 582 (1950).
90. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972) (codified in 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1978)).
91. Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251 § 5108(a), 92 Stat. 183.
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of administrative justice. When the APA examiner provisions went into
effect, the federal agencies employed 197 examiners. At the beginning of
1978, there were 997 administrative law judges in twenty-three federal
agencies; over half (670) were in the Social Security Administration,
thereby reflecting the impact of that agency's mass justice upon the
administrative process. Only the fiscal squeeze of recent years has
prevented the number from rising substantially higher. The Social
Security Administration alone projects an administrative law judge corps
of well over 1,000 in the next decade.
In the next century, we can predict that there may well be a federal
administrative judiciary running into the thousands and administrative
law judges in ever-increasing numbers dispensing both regulatory justice
and the mass justice of an expanding welfare state. In addition, a similar
trend toward hearing officer judicialization may also be expected in the
states. Maine92 and California93 have adopted the title of administrative
law judge and administrative court judge. Other states are also starting to
follow the federal model.94
E. Broader Perspective
The next century may thus see an ever-growing federal and state
administrative judiciary that will dwarf the traditional judiciary in the
courts. From a broader point of view, there may be repetition on a larger
scale of the situation in sixteenth and seventeenth century English law. In
his Rede lecture, Maitland pointed out that at the end of Queen Mary's
reign, "the judges had nothing to do but 'to look about them.' "9 The
inadequacies of the common law and the expense and delay involved in
lawsuits had led the bulk of the community to avoid the courts at all costs.
The jurisdiction of the judges was being superseded by other tribunals,
notably the Star Chamber and Chancery.
The movement away from the common law in Tudor and Stuart times
was a movement away from justice administered in law courts to justice
administered in what were, for all intents and purposes, administrative
tribunals. The ensuing struggle by the common law to reestablish its
supremacy has interesting implications for our own day.
When the common lawyers eventually triumphed after the final
expulsion of the Stuarts, they did not attempt to turn the legal clock back
to pre-Tudor times. Instead, they sought to retain what was desirable in
the administrative justice of their day and to fit it into its proper place in the
legal order.
92. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 10051 (Supp. 1978).
93. Members of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals State Board are, for example,
known as administrative law judges.
94. In New York, for example, review board members ofthe Public Service Commission are as a
matter of custom called administrative law judges.
95. F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 22 (1901).
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Although the Star Chamber as such was abolished, the law courts
realized that a large part of its work was of permanent value, and therefore
much of its law passed into the common law. And the place of Chancery
in the legal system was definitely confirmed. Chancery was retained as a
separate tribunal, but it was wholly judicialized along common-law lines.
The Lord Chancellor, who was originally the chief clerk of the King and
dealt out administrative justice in the King's name, became, in time, the
head of a true court with an established place in the existing legal order.96
The challenge of administrative justice in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was met by the elimination of the undesirable
elements in such justice and the retention and judicialization of the rest.
The arbitrary discretion exercised by the agencies was canalized within
legal limits, and where such discretion was, as in the case of Star Chamber,
too intimate a part of the tribunal, the tribunal itself was done away with.
The common lawyers, who had earlier complained that the justice
dispensed by. Chancery was so uncontrolled by legal principles that it
might just as well have depended on the size of the particular Chancellor's
foot, were able to ensure that Chancery became a true court for the
application of principles that, though somewhat different from those of the
common law, were no less fixed.
The challenge faced by the law in Tudor and Stuart days was well
stated by Chief Justice Vanderbilt: "Then, as now, the administration of
the common law left much to be desired. Then, as now, what was needed
was more administration in the courts of justice and more of the
fundamental principles of justice in the . .. tribunals. 97 The courts
reformed through an infusion of then-modern concepts of law and
administration and the elimination of undesirable elements in the newer
justice. The rest wasjudicialized and fitted into its proper place in the legal
order.
The recent rise of the federal administrative judiciary indicates that
the administrative law of the next century may follow the pattern of the
executive tribunals of three centuries ago. The justice now dispensed by
the agencies will become truly judicialized and administered by judges
possessing solely judicial authority. Our administrative law will then
become as much a part of our ordinary law as has the law of equity, which
was originally developed by the Court of Chancery.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Until recently, the dominant consideration in fashioning the law of
judicial review was that of deference to the administrative expert. The
96. Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding Co., 2 N.J. 356, 366, 66 A.2d 726, 731 (1949).
97. Vanderbilt, The Place of the Administrative Tribunal in our Legal System,24 A.B.A.J.267,
273 (1938).
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result has been a theory of review that limits the extent to which the
discretion of the expert may be scrutinized by the nonexpert judge. The
basic approach was one stated a generation ago: "We certainly have
neither technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the
wisdom of the course taken by the Commission."98
This judicial attitude has started to change, giving way to articulation
of judicial doubts about the desirability of the trend toward narrow review
of administrative authority. According to Judge Bazelon, it is no longer
enough for the courts regularly to uphold agency action "with a nod in the
direction of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mysteries of
administrative expertise."99 A more positive judicial role is demanded by
the changing character of administration litigation: "[C]ourts are
increasingly asked to review administrative litigation that touches on
fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. . . .To protect
these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary . .. to
insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action."' 0
A. Near Term: Availability of Review
As far as judicial review is concerned, one must distinguish between
short- and long-term trends. In the near term (let us say the next quarter
century), there should be an intensification of recent tendencies. This
means a further expansion of the availability of review and a broadening of
the scope of review.
1. Standing
Expansion in the availability of review will be accomplished first of all
by a continued broadening of the categories of plaintiffs who possess the
standing needed to bring review actions. "The past decade, has seen a
dramatic lowering of the barriers imposed by standing requirements to
challenges of administrative action."' ' The restricted concept of standing
that formerly prevailed has given way to an ever-widening concept that has
increasingly opened the courts to challenges against administration action.
The lowering of standing barriers may be expected to continue, since
standing is so closely related to the growing movement toward par-
ticipatory democracy. The legal system, like other institutions, must
give the citizen the means of making his impact more directly on the
governmental process. In administrative law this means growing
recognition of the role of the public in judicial review. As the New York
court put it in a case broadening taxpayer standing, "it would be
98. Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942).
99. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir, 1971).
100. Id. at 597-98.
101. Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 610 (2d Cir. 1975) (Kaufman, C.J., dissenting),
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particularly repellant today, when every encouragement to the individual
citizen-taxpayer is to take an active, aggressive interest in his State as well
as his local and national government, to continue to exclude him from
access to the judicial process . .. , the classical means for effective
scrutiny of legislative and executive action."
10 2
The next quarter century should see an extension of the state
jurisprudence upholding taxpayer standing, exemplified by this New York
case, to federal administrative law, which is still dominated by
Frothingham v. Mellon10 3 and its denial of standing to federal taxpayers.
In addition, we can expect a liberalization of the present bipartite injury
test followed by the Supreme Court, under which a plaintiff seeking review
must show (I) that the challenged agency act caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise, and (2) that the alleged injury was to an interest
arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the relevant
statute.' 4 Justice Brennan has urged that the bipartite injury test is
needlessly complex and that all that should be needed for standing is injury
in fact. 105 The single "injury in fact" test has been adopted by most state
courts,' °6 and one can predict that the same test will be adopted by the
federal courts in the not too distant future. All that will be required for
standing will be that plaintiff allege that he has suffered harm (economic,
qualitative, aesthetic, or environmental) as a result of defendant agency's
action.
Can we go further and predict that the review action will ultimately be
treated as the actiopopularis of the later Roman law; that is, an action with
no restrictions on the standing of those who seek to bring it? A few years
ago Judge Friendly expressed doubt about a proposal by the present writer
and an English colleague that we follow England in not demanding
standing as a prerequisite to judicial review: 0 7 "One may . ..endorse
recent relaxation of the requirement of standing .. .without agreeing to
its abolition, even assuming that this was permissible under the
constitutional provision limiting the federal judiciary to 'cases' and
'controversies.' ,108 It is probable that the courts will follow the Friendly
view. Standing requirements will be further relaxed along the lines
already indicated, but a plaintiff will still be required to show some injury
102. Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361,364,334 N.E.2d 579. 581,372 N.Y.S.2d 623,626
(1975).
103. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Here the Court stated that a person asking the Court to hold a federal
act unconstitutional "must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Id. at 488.
104. Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
105. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. See New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113 N.H. 127, 129, 302A.2d 810.811(1973).
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.00-3 (1971).
107. B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE. supra note 41, at 291.
108. Friendly, supra note 41, at xx.
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in fact (even if causation is as attenuated as that in the SCRAP case)'0 ' -
"some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the
street."ll°
2. Due Process
In other respects, too, the availability of review will continue to be
broadened. In 1973 three dissenting Justices referred to a key admin-
istrative law question that the Court had always avoided-whether there
is a due process right to judicial review."' Though the Court did not
then, as these dissenters claimed, answer that question sub silentio, it may
be expected that it will be answered in the affirmative if it is squarely
presented in a future case. The Court has already stated that preclusion of
review is not lightly to be inferred. 1 2  Increasing awareness of the
importance of review as a safeguard'1 3 should lead the Court to strike
down statutory preclusive provisions if their terms cannot be nullified by
judicious interpretation." 14
3. Sovereign Immunity
In two other important areas availability of review will be enlarged:
sovereign immunity and forms of action. By the turn of the next century,
it may be hoped that the last vestiges of sovereign immunity will have
disappeared from our public law. The trend toward legislative and
judicial elimination of sovereign immunity as a barrier to tort claims
against government will make public tort liability part of the law in every
American jurisdiction." 5 Hopefully, too, present inadequacies in the
Federal Tort Claims Act will be corrected (substituting public liability for
that of the individual officer, but providing at the same timefor indemnity
by the latter when he acts with fraud, corruption, malice, or gross
negligence,' 6 and providing for absolute public tort liability, at least in
cases in which there is comparable liability imposed upon a private
tortfeasor).1 7 Happily, the lacuna that existed in the law caused by the
109. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
110. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (Powell, J.. concurring).
111. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,661,664-65 (1973) (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., & Marshall,
J., dissenting).
112. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
113. Precluding review, in Justice Douglas' phrase, makes a "tyrant" out of every agency
officer. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. Cf. Hirschfeld v. Commission on Claims, 376 A.2d 71 (Conn. 1977) (review available
despite strong preclusive provision).
115. For a recent case, see Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
116. Contra, United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
117. Contra, Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
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misapplication of sovereign immunity to bar actions seeking specific relief
has now been corrected."
8
4. Forms of Review Actions
There will also be liberalizing changes with regard to the forms of
review actions. The Supreme Court has resolved conflict among the
circuits by holding that the Administrative Procedure Act is not an
independent source of review jurisdiction.1 9 The decision represents a
backward step, 20 and it is to be hoped that the Congress will amend the
APA to correct the decision.
It is hoped that in the states the present confusion that surrounds
forms of review action will give way to comprehensive provision for an
exclusive simplified form of review. Critics have been urging such a
uniform system of review by a single, simple form of action for years.
Similar criticisms in England have led to a recent amendment in the rules
of the English High Court, which now provide for one unified review
action called an "application for judicial review" in place of the previous
technical procedures for applying for the various kinds of prerogative
orders.' 2' Is it fanciful to trust that the English reform will have a more
immediate effect on what is still, in so many ways, an Anglophile legal
system?
B. Near Term: Scope of Review
The scope of review of administrative action has been profoundly
influenced by the activist role assumed by the courts in recent years.
American judges, accustomed to having the last word on constitutional
issues that affect the very warp and woof of the society, constantly
overrule the acts of the political departments in the process. In area after
area the courts, led by the Supreme Court, have had to step in to serve as
spearheads of social change when the political branches have proved
unable or unwilling to act. Judges who have thus performed a virtually
legislative function have inevitably felt freer than their predecessors in
overruling decisions of the legislature's delegates.
The most significant extension in scope of review in recent years has
occurred in California, where courts have developed a rule of broad review
in cases involving so-called fundamental rights. The leading case of
Strumsky v. San Diego Employees Retirement Associationt22 states the
rule as follows:
118. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L.No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. hl 702-703
(1976)).
119. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
120. For a more detailed treatment of this theme, see Schwartz, Califano v. Sanders and
Administrative Procedure Act Interpretation, 55 TExAs L. REv. 1323 (1977).
121. STAT. INST., pt. 111, § 2 (1977).
122. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112.Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
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If the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental
vested right, the trial court, in determining ...whether there has been an
abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence,
must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of
discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.,' 123
This California version of the supposedly discredited Ben Avon
doctrine 124 is, if anything, broader than Ben Avon itself, which was
confined to constitutional rights. Under the California rule, a right may
be "fundamental" even if it is not a constitutional right-as was true of the
right of a police officer's widow to a service-connected death allowance in
the Strumsky case. The California rule is a direct consequence of the
increasing judicial vigilance to protect individual rights and the growing
disenchantment with the claims of administrative expertise. The
California court has asserted that when an agency decision affects a
fundamental right, full review is appropriate because" 'abrogation of the
right is too important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive
administrative extinction.' ,,125 The result is a substantial broadening of
the scope of review, which may set a pattern for the last quarter of the
century.
The California approach may be seen as a logical consequence of the
tendency in recent years to permit broad review of agency action affecting
personal rights. The preferred status of personal rights in present-day
public law has led the Supreme Court to adopt a stricter standard for
judging restrictions on them than its standard for judging restrictions on
property rights. Thus, when agency action affects such personal rights
protected by the Constitution as the right of citizenship, 126 there may be
room for broader review. 127 Similarly, the fundamental interests at stake
under the first amendment help to explain why independent review of an
agency determination of the constitutional fact of obscenity is required.'28
We may expect the courts in coming years to continue the attempt to
assert a more active review role. One way to accomplish this would be to
extend the broad review now asserted by the federal courts in personal
123. Id. at 32,520 P.2d at3I, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 807. For a more recent application of the rule, see
Cal. Rptr. 805,807(1974). For a more recent application ofthe rule, see Anton v. San Antonio Hlosp.,
19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 41 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
124. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1)20). In Ben Avon, the Court
held that when a public service commission is given the legislative power to prescribe future rates
chargeable by a utility, due process of law under the fourteenth amendment requires that the state
provide a fair opportunity for the utility to present its claim of confiscation to a judicial tribunal for
determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts. The Pennsylvania statute
in question in Ben Avon was declared unconstitutional since it purported to withhold from reviewing
courts the power to determine the question of confiscation accordiog to their own independent
judgment.
125. Strumsky v. San Diego Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28,32,520 P.2d 29,33, 112
Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 (1974).
126. See Agosto v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 436 U.S. 748 (1978).
127. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968).
128. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 101-02 (1973).
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rights cases to other rights, leading ultimately to adoption of something
like the California fundamental rights doctrine. Other expansive
approaches would extend review power to allow inquiry into the
reasonableness of agency penalties or sanctions, which the Supreme Court
has held generally to be beyond the reviewing court's proper scope of
inquiry. 29  They would also enlarge the scope of review over agency
discretion, for example, by extending review beyond abuse of discretion to
cases of unwarranted exercise of discretion.1
3 0
In dealing with the scope of review, one must take particular care to
distinguish between what courts say and what they do. We may expect the
judges to continue to talk in terms of review limited by the substantial
evidence rule, with continued ritual obeisance to the mystique of
administrative expertise. Yet that will not stop reviewing courts from
doing justice in the particular case. "A general proposition," as Holmes
noted, "is simply a string for the facts."' 31 When counsel is able to dent the
mass of cases confronting the court and convince thejudges that the facts
show that the agency did not deal fairly with his client, even if the agency
findings are, theoretically speaking, supported by substantial evidence, no
general theory of limited review will prevent a reversal.
One may predict that growing disenchantment with the administra-
tive process will lead courts to extend the scope of review. The pervasive
mistrust of government has not extended to reviewing courts. Ifanything,
people tend to trust judges more than administrators and would approve
an extension of review authority.
How effective broader review would be is another matter. In
practical terms, it may be impossible for the courts to give anything near
the individual attention needed for effective scrutiny in more than a small
minority of the mass of review cases before them. More than any theory
of limited review, it is the pressure of the judicial calendar, combined with
the elephantine bulk of the record in so many review proceedings, that
leads to perfunctory affirmance of the vast majority of agency decisions.
C. The Longer Term
History, says William James, is essentially the story of man's attempt
129. Butz v. Glover Livestock Co., 411 U.S. 182(1973). Cf. Zink v. Sausalito, 10 Cal. App. 3d
662,139 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1977) (Strunsky rule of full review, see note 122supra, not applicable to review
of penalties imposed by agency).
130. C. Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 15(7) (f) (1961), which provides:
(7) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the wveight of
the evidence on questions of fact; but it may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the
case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inference,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
131. 2 0. HOLMES-F. POLLOCK LETERs 13 (M. Howe ed. 1961).
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"to find the more inclusive order."'3 2 In law, the "more inclusive order" is
a judicial system which has a monopoly in the dispensation of justice and
which gradually embraces within its jurisdiction the tribunals and organs
that may once have decided cases outside the judicial process. In early
English law, the development occurred when the king's courts took over
the justice formerly dispensed by feudal courts, local courts, and the mass
of anomalous jurisdictions that had grown up over the centuries. A
similar development took place during the conflict in the seventeenth
century between the law courts and executive tribunals that culminated in
the absorption of the latter into the judicial system.133 It has already been
indicated that administrative justice during the next century may well
follow the pattern of the executive tribunals of three centuries ago, with an
administrative judiciary performing the adjudicatory functions of agencies
within the framework of the judicial system.
If such a completejudicialization of administrative justice does occur,
it will completely alter the situation with regard to judicial review. If
administrative justice becomes part of the judicial system, what we now
term judicial review will become a branch of appellate review. The
reviewing court will act virtually as a hierarchical superior, playing the part
not of today's reviewing court but of a court of appeal.
If that happens most of the judicial review problems discussed will be
eliminated. Review of the administrative judiciary will be governed by the
same principles that govern appeals in the courts. That, in itself, may
create new problems concerning issues such as standing. Under
traditional rules of standing, only the parties may appeal from lower
courts. Is the same limitation necessarily desirable in an administrative
law case, which may have impact far beyond the immediate parties?
Perhaps the same considerations that have led to relaxation of rigid
standing requirements may justify a broader approach to the question of
who will have a right to appeal from the decisions of the administrative
judicial system.
Even if the predicted development does take place, it will substitute
appellate review for the present system only in the area of administrative
justice. Presumably the trend toward fulljudicialization will not affect the
nonadjudicatory functions of agencies, particularly their authority to
promulgate rules and regulations. Exercise of rule-making power will still
be by agencies subject to judicial review in the present sense. This will not
be a minor matter, given the recent judicial trend favoring agency rule-
making authority.134
132. W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE 195-206 (1897), quoted ir, I R. POUND, JtRISRUDINCL
542-43 (1959).
133. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
134. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); California
Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967).
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The predicted administrative judiciary in the next century will, as
already indicated, be far more numerous than the traditional judiciary in
the courts. Most of thejudges in the country will then be members of what
will amount to administrative trial courts. If that occurs it may be
expected that there will be a strong movement to create administrative
appellate courts somewhat along the lines of the French system. The
Constitution's article III provision for one Supreme Court and
comparable state constitutional provisions may make it impossible to
establish a supreme administrative court like the French Conseil d'Etat,
but there is no constitutional barrier to one or more administrative
appellate courts below the Supreme Court.
It is to be hoped that the momentum behind the development of an
administrative trial judiciary as part of thejudicial system will not lead to a
successful demand for administrative appellate courts based upon the
claim that only such courts would have the expertise needed to deal with
the highly technical and complex issues that arise in administrative law
cases. The call for expertise inevitably strikes a responsive chord in the
ears of laymen, and no occasion need be made for disparaging the whole
race of experts. But those who seize upon expertness as the "be all and end
all" of judicial review ignore the lessons of both Anglo-American and
French legal history. In addition, the proponents of a system of
specialized courts overlook the advantages of review by courts of broad
jurisdiction, which can bring to particular cases a wide range of experience,
knowledge, and understanding, as well as a proper detachment from
narrower interests.
It is the great virtue of the Anglo-American judicial process that it
employs judges who are not specialists in any one field of legal endeavor
but capable by disposition and training of dealing with all types of cases.
The limitations of the expert-inability to see beyond the narrow confines
of his own experience, intolerance of the layman, and excessive zeal in
carrying out his own policy regardless of the cost to other, broader
interests of society-are subjected under our system to the trained scrutiny
of the non-expert judge, who, uninfluenced by professional bias, is able to
take a view broader than mere promotion of administrative policy in the
particular case without regard for the ultimate cost.
One trained in Anglo-American traditions and techniques must
conclude that more would be lost than gained by segregating administra-
tive law by means of a separate system of administrative courts. Of
course, there are deficiencies as things stand now. But the cure is not a
complex structural alteration that would eliminate the review role of the
ordinary courts, with the profound constitutional implications of such an
alteration.
CONCLUSION
"We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and
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fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts." 135
Administrative law is now at a turning point. Before 1936, the stress was
on delegations of power and their reconciliation with constitutional
traditions. The Morgan cases 36 shifted the emphasis to administrative
procedure. For thirty-five years, the procedural pattern was worked out
in the regulatory agencies and then extended to the new areas of social
welfare. The basic principles were codified in the federal Administrative
Procedure Act and its state counterparts.
We now seem to be moving toward a new period whose essential
outlines are not yet clear. The situation is complicated by current dis-
illusionment with the administrative process. The goal of cheap and
inexpensive justice by experts, one of the chief reasons for setting up
agencies, has proved illusory. The administrative process has too often
proved even more expensive and time-consuming than thejudicial process.
Even more important has been the increasing failure of agencies to
protect that very public interest they were created to serve. The
administrative process, which had once been vigorous in fighting for the
public interest, has become an established part of the economic status quo.
It has come to terms with those it is ostensibly regulating: the "public
interest" is equated more and more with the interest of those being
regulated. For the age-old central question of political science, "Quis
custodiet ipsos custodes?" ("Who will regulate the regulators?"), our
system has given a new answer: those who are regulated themselves.
Whether or not the trends projected in this article will enable our
administrative law to cope with this problem is beyond this article's scope.
Even so, few authors are as rash as those who venture into print with
projections of coming developments. As a newspaper once described the
present writer's effort to predict future Supreme Court tendencies, "He
would be on much safer ground trying to forecast the winner of the 1958
Kentucky Derby, for which nominations have not even been made as
yet."'3 7 Perhaps all we can say with assurance is to repeat, with Camus,
that the wheel turns, history changes."' 38  Administrative law will
continue to evolve, as it has until the present; all we can hope is that it will
continue to meet the changing needs of the society it serves.
135. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruekelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
136. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); United States v, Morgan. 307 U.S. 183
(1939); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Morgan v. United States. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
137. The Court Confuses a Noted Professor, Shreveport Times, July 13. 1957, at 4A, col, 2.
138. A. CAMus, RESISTANcE, REBELLION, AND DFATH 7 (1960).
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